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CHAPTER 19 
Hidden Power Shifts: Multilevel Governance 
and Interstitial Institutional Change 
in Europe 
Adrienne Héritier 
INTRODUCTION 
Substantial institutional changes, institutions defined as rules of behav-
iour (North 1990), occur not only in open arenas meant to design and 
negotiate formal institutional changes. Rather they also happen inter-
stitially between these salient events, in a covert way leading to infor-
mal institutional changes which, however, may considerably change the 
institutional status quo. Which are the underlying causal mechanisms of 
interstitial institutional changes, and, in particular, how are they influ-
enced by a multilevel context in which actors are negotiating informal 
institutional changes? Arthur Benz (1992, 2009, 2016) has argued 
that the dynamics of multilevel governance and multi-arena governance 
offers new opportunities and limitations in a formal bargaining process. 
However, the same dynamics offer also additional opportunities and 
restrictions for actors to strengthen their power in the re-negotiation 
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of incomplete institutional rules. Incomplete formal institutional rules 
are renegotiated in the course of their application and lead to informal 
institutional rules. This can also be observed in the case of the European 
Parliament (EP) when seeking to extend its powers under institutional 
rules. Which typical patterns can we identify and which are the factors 
of success and failure when the EP used strategies across levels and are-
nas to bring about informal institutional changes in its favour? The arti-
cle shows that in three cases of European politics, the nomination and 
investiture of the Commission President, the nomination and investiture 
of individual Commissioners and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), the EP's use of multilevel strategies and cross-
arena strategies brought about an interstitial institutional change in its 
favour. The article first develops the theoretical argument and a num-
ber of hypotheses, secondly, describes the methodology used in order to 
empirically assess the plausibility of the hypotheses. It thirdly presents the 
empirical material in the three cases and concludes by assessing the valid-
ity of the hypotheses in the light of the empirical material. 
THEORETICAL ARGUMENT: CHANGING INSTITUTIONAL RULES: 
A RATIONALIST, DOWER-BASED BARGAINING EXPLANATION 
OF INFORMAL, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
To explain informal empowerment of the EP, we base our argument on a 
rationA,  institutionalist bargaining theory of institutional change  (Héritier 
2007).1  At the micro-level, it is assumed that actors are boundedly rational 
and do not have perfect information because there are cognitive limits 
to and transaction costs of information collection. It is further assumed 
that actors seek to maximise their institutional power in order to increase 
their influence over policy outcomes. At the macro-level, it is assumed 
that actors interact in a given institutional context, in this particular case 
in a multilevel institutional context and a  multi-arena context at the 
same level. These decision-making processes are subject to specific deci-
sion-making rules, such as unanimity rule or majority rule. Moreover, the 
dynamics of multilevel governance are compounded by the fact, as Benz 
[Authors share similar assumptions of rational behaviour to explain the empowerment of 
the EP. However, their work focuses exclusively on the role of member states in the shaping 
of formal treaty rules. By contrast, we focus on the role of the EP in changing formal and 
informal institutional rules. 
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has elaborated in his work, that at one and the same level various actors' 
decisions need to be coordinated, before interacting with other actors at 
the higher level. This leads to a complex web of sequential interactions 
between actors across levels, but also at the same level that needs to be 
accommodated in order to come to a decision. Institutions are defined 
as sets of man-made rules of behaviour that facilitate and restrict social 
interaction (North 1990). They guide interaction in the accomplish-
ment of joint tasks, such as legislation. The existing rules allow the actors 
involved to incorporate the expectations of the actions of other involved 
actors into their own decision-making (Lake and Powell 1999). This is 
because these actors assume that the other actors will more or less abide 
by the existing rules in order to avoid sanctions. Institutional rules, there-
fore, constitute an important source of information in forming expecta-
tions as to how other actors are likely to behave. 
Given bounded rationality and the transaction costs of information 
collection, negotiation and monitoring of contract compliance, these 
institutional rules are assumed to constitute incomplete contracts which 
will be subject to re-negotiation in the course of their application. We 
specifically focus on the question of what the distributional implica-
tions of institutional rules are, how a change of rule comes about, who 
it favours and who it does not, how it shapes the strategic preferences 
of actors and how this fact affects the further re-negotiation of the rule. 
These theoretical considerations are applied to analyse the strategies used 
by the EP to bring about an alteration of pre-existing formal rules in the 
course of their application, giving rise to new informal institutional rules 
that extend the powers of the EP. We define an informal institutional 
rule as one that is not subject to formal third party dispute resolution or 
formal sanctioning, usually not written down and developed outside the 
formal decision-making channels (Farrell and 
 Héritier 
 2003, 2007a, b). 
Interstitial Institutional Change: 
The Emergence of Informal Institutions 
Starting from the above assumptions of actors' bounded rationality, we 
argue that formal institutional rules mostly are incomplete contracts2 
2Assuming bounded rationality implies that when actors design institutional rules 
(contracts), they are unable to take into account every relevant contingency. Decisions are 
time-consuming and costly. 
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(Héritier  2007; Farrell and Héritier  2003, 2004, 2005, 2007x, b; Stacey 
and Rittberger 2003). The incompleteness of contracts/institutional 
rules flows from the high costs of collecting information on possible cir- 
cumstances of contract application, but also from the diversity of inter-
ests and high transaction costs of the actors negotiating the initial formal 
institutional rule. Actors often settle for quite vague rule formulations in 
order to save the transaction costs of negotiating, and—given diversity of 
preferences 	 to allow for an agreement at all. As a result and due to the 
ambiguity of the institutional formal rule and possible external events, 
the formal rule will be subject to renegotiation in the course of its appli-
cation and this may therefore give rise to an informal institutional rule. 
The new informal institutional rules emerging in the course of the 
rule application of the formal initial rule may serve merely to increase 
efficiency, i.e. reduce the transaction costs in the application of the rule 
for all concerned. Alternatively, the new informal institutional rule may 
imply a relative power shift in the position of the actors involved. Here 
the focus rests on the informal institutional rules which imply a power 
shift between actors. 
The redefinition of the initial formal rule takes the form of an implicit 
bargaining process and its outcome reflects the relative power of the 
actors involved. Two factors determine the relative power of actors. 
Firstly, their formal institutional positions in the decision-malting pro-
cess at ti  which defines an actor's competences and thereby influences 
the actor's ability to credibly threaten specific kinds of action, such as 
the unanimity rule purveying the right of veto to every actor. Further 
institutional conditions of decision-making, described above, may also 
determine the outcome of the bargaining process; for example, whether 
decision-malting occurs in arenas across multiple levels or whether there 
is a multiple-issue- or a single-issue-agenda etc. Second, an actor's availa-
ble fall-back position, should negotiations fail, will determine its relative 
power when negotiating an informal rule. The longer the time horizon 
of an actor, the lower the intensity of its preferences, the more powerful 
it will be in the bargaining process. Patience enables it to make credi-
ble threats with regard to one or more items of negotiation in order 
to enhance its overall position in the bargaining process (Knight 1995;  
Elster  1989; Luce and Raiffa 1957; Nash 1953). Given specific actors' 
preferences, the institutional conditions at tl, the available fall-back posi-
tion of actors will determine the distributive outcomes of the (implicitly) 
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negotiated informal institutional rule which will specify the initial formal 
ambiguous rule. 
The EP's Strategies to Obtain Informal Institutional Changes 
How can we explain an informal institutional change in favour of one 
specific actor? Or more specifically, how can we explain how in a con-
text of multilevel governance, as analysed in the context of Arthur Benz' 
work, that the EP can obtain an informal change of an institutional rule 
in its favour? If issues are negotiated in more than one arena3 and level at 
one point in time, the EP may use a strategy which links the two arenas 
in order to seek an advantage for itself in one arena. The EP has a more 
fav'purable opportunity structure. 
This is the so-called arena-linking strategy, a strategy that is frequently 
used by the EP. Assuming decision-making close in time in (at least) two 
political arenas at the same or different levels, we argue that the renego-
tiation of an existing formal institutional rule can be influenced by the 
establishment of a link between the two arenas. The EP with limited or 
no competences in one arena can withhold its support for a decision in 
another arena at the same level, where it has full competences until it 
obtains more informal institutional powers in the arena with limited or 
no competences. In simple terms: one arena is taken hostage in order to 
obtain more institutional power in another arena. However, this strategy 
will only be successful if the gains of the EP's acquiescence in the one 
arena outweigh the loss incurred by the other actors by an informal insti-
tutional power gain of the EP in the other arena. Therefore we submit: 
HI: Linked-arenas hypothesis 
"If the most powerful actors' gains from an agreement in arena 
 Y out-
weigh the costs of accommodating the EP's preferences in arena X, the 
EP obtains an (in)formal institutional change in its favour by linking 
3An arena is a formal decision-making setting with its formally competent decision-
makers deciding on an issue or a number of issues at a specific point in time. In our cases 
we focus on a treaty shaping arena and an intergovernmental arena. In other work we 
focused on legislative arenas deciding under co-decision on legislative issues. 
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its formal veto in arena Y  to an (in)formal institutional concessions in 
arena X." 
Another across-levels and across-arena strategy used by the EP to 
increase its informal institutional power is to take "unilateral action" and 
act as à  "first mover" across levels and across arenas in such a way as to 
foreclose specific institutional options to the other actors involved, or to 
at least render the reversal of the first move at t2 very costly. By intro-
ducing an informal institutional innovation with respect to the other 
involved actors, it may create institutional "facts" that may turn out to 
be costly to reverse by the other actors. 
Just to give two examples of important institutional innovations uni-
laterally introduced by the EP: the EP's nominating and electing of a 
Commission President; and the EP introducing hearings for individual 
Commissioners proposed by member governments. We therefore claim: 
H2: Unilateral action or `first-mover' hypothesis 
"If the costs of returning to the status quo ante are high, the EP obtains 
an (in)formal institutional change in its favour by taking the first move to 
unilaterally invent and implement a new rule." 
Another, frequently employed strategy by the EP in a multilevel and 
multiple arena structure is to lobby and mobilise external political and 
societal actors at the European level or the international level. It would 
form informal alliances with them, in order to pursue its goals of infor-
mal institutional empowerment in the European context. Hence, we 
submit: 
H3: Mobilising external actors hypothesis 
"If there are powerful and common-good oriented actors, who are gen-
erally in favour of empowering the EP, the latter may obtain an infor-
mal institutional change in its favour by mobilizing these actors, if these 
actors influence the formal decision-makers so as to empower the EP." 
In the following these three hypotheses will be empirically assessed in 
three empirical cases, the nomination of the  EU Commission President, 
the nomination and confirmation of individual Commissioners and 
the TTIP agreement. We argue that the choice of strategy by the EP 
is guided by the fact whether preconditions are the causes favouring a 
successful application of a strategy given at the point of action. We also 
show in the three cases under empirical scrutiny that strategies may be 
combined. 
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THE EMPIRICAL CASES 
Methodology 
In order to empirically assess the hypotheses, we use the congruence 
method in combination with process-tracing (George and Bennett 2005, 
pp. 181, 121). The congruence method starts from a theoretical argu-
ment, as developed in the theory part. First, it is identified which of 
our factors favouring the successful use of an EP strategy leading to an 
empowerment of the EP are found in each case study. When the hypoth-
esized conditions are found it is investigated whether the expected 
outcome (informal institutional change in favour of the EP) is given. 
 
t  In order to identify the causal mechanism (i.e. the strategies applied) 
that are posited to lead to a change in informal institutional power, the 
method of process tracing (George and Bennett 2005) is used to iden-
tify causality in addition to congruence between the hypothesised cause 
or condition and the explanandum, which could, in principle, be pure 
coincidence (Héritier 
 2008, pp. 69-72). The three hypotheses regarding 
EP strategies used in order to extend its informal institutional power are 
discussed in three cases. Data is collected using a triangulation of meth-
ods. We analysed official documents and press material, conducted five 
semi-structured interviews with EU 
 officials, analysed quantitative data if 
relevant, and used secondary literature. 
Case One: The 
 Spitzenkandidaten Strategy4 
By opting for the "Spitzenkandidaten 
 Strategy" in the nomination of the 
Commission President, the EP pre-empted member states' actions and 
thus prevailed in the interpretation of the corresponding treaty provision 
as to how to select a Commission President. It offers a confirmation of 
the unilateral action or first-mover' hypothesis: "If the costs of returning 
to the status quo ante are high, the EP obtains an (in)formal institutional 
change in its favour by taking the first move to unilaterally invent and 
implement a new rule" (1-12). 
The Lisbon Treaty stated that: "taking into account the elections 
to the European Parliament and after having held the appropriate 
4Tliis Section is based on Héritier et al. (2018).  
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consultations", the European Council "proposes to the European 
Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission [ ... ] [who] shall 
be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component 
members". 
At the Warsaw Council in December 2010, the PES (Party of 
European Socialists) decided to exploit the ambiguity - introduced by the 
term `election' in the Lisbon Treaty to nominate a candidate from their 
party for the post of President of the European Commission although 
the Treaty clearly states that the candidate is to be proposed follow-
ing member states' proposals by the European Council. Nonetheless, 
the Commission was supportive of other political parties following this 
move of the PES.  In his State of the Union Address before the EP in 
September 2012, the President of the Commission, Barroso, stated that 
"an important means to deepen the pan-European political debate would 
be the presentation by European political parties of their candidate for 
the post of Commission President at the European Parliament elections 
already in 2014" (Barroso, State of the Union Address, 2012). Very 
likely the reason for this support from the Commission is that it would 
see its own legitimacy enhanced if its President were picked and directly 
elected by the EP, i.e. the only EU  institution directly elected by citizens. 
In November 2012, the EP, in another unilateral move, voted for 
a resolution on elections to the EP in 2014 in which it urged "the 
European political parties to nominate candidates for the Presidency of 
the Commission and expect those candidates to play a leading role in 
the parliamentary electoral campaign in particular by personally present-
ing their programme in all Member States of the Union" (Hobolt 2014,  
p. 1532). 
The then President of the EP, Martin Schulz and the EP Secretary 
General, Klaus Welle,  were very active in promoting such a strategy. 
For example, the Secretary General observed in September 2013 that: 
"[P]eople are now finding out — to their astonishment — that [ ... ] the 
Lisbon Treaty has very much changed the legal basis for the process on 
how to get the Commission into office. First, the EP `elects' — not simply 
`approves' — the Commission President. Second, the European Council 
selects its nominee for President based on the outcome of the European 
elections" (Welle 2013, cited by Dinan 2014). 
In a non-binding  resolution on "Improving the practical arrange-
ments for the holding of the European elections in 2014" (EP Report 
2013 regarding 2014 elections), the EP set out to define practical details 
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of the desired new arrangements. It called for political parties to nom-
inate their candidates for Commission President sufficiently early to 
ensure they would be able to promote a pan-European campaign. It 
also asked the European Council to first consider the candidate put for-
ward by the European political party that wins most seats in the elec-
tions. Accordingly, Schulz was confirmed as candidate for the European 
Socialist Party in 2013 and four of the six European parties followed its 
lead and selected their own candidates for Commission President in early 
2014.5  
Some member states, in particular Germany and the UK as well 
as other national leaders, together with the President of the European 
Council, Herman. Van Rompuy, initially voiced their disagreement with 
the EP's interpretation of the Treaty provision and nominating its own 
candidates. 
Yet, after several parties had selected their candidates, it became 
increasingly difficult for heads of states to push the EP initiative back 
and propose an alternative candidate for presidency. Individual poten-
tial national candidates were wary when considering the risk of running 
against a candidate supported by an EP majority. Moreover, in Germany, 
Chancellor Merkel was pressured by MEPs from her own party and her 
 
SPD 
 junior partner. This illustrates how the EP's unilateral action had 
greatly increased the costs of returning to the status quo ante for mem-
ber states. After the elections in May 2014 that gave the EPP a major-
ity, it was agreed by the leaders of the four political groups that had put 
forward candidates to ask the European Council to invite Jean Claude 
Juneker to be a candidate for the post of President of the Commission. 
This proposal was backed by the European Council, with finally only the 
UK and Hungary voting against (Peterson 2017). In June 2014, Jean-
Claude Juncker was elected by the EP by the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe, and some of the European Socialists and Greens. 
The Heads of State and Government obliged, but only after the unprec-
edented move of the two countries that had opposed his nomination 
explicitly requesting a vote and voting negatively. 
'The Eurosceptic right-wing Euro-parties, the Alliance of European Conservatives and 
Reformists (AECR) and the Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy did not 
nominate any candidate. 
4 
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The creation of this new rule is a clear confirmation of the `first-
mover hypothesis' (1-12): If the costs of returning to the status quo ante 
are high, the EP obtains an institutional change in its favour. The con-
gruence test shows that in view of high costs of returning to the status 
quo ante, member states accepted the informal institutional power gain 
obtained by the EP. 
Case Two: The European Parliament's Informal Voice 
in Appointing Individual Commissioners 
Again, through a strategy of a unilateral move (H2) introducing an 
informal institutional rule of organizing hearings for Commissioners pro- 
posed by member states, and linking its approval of individual proposals 
to its right of confirming the Commission in its entirety (arena linking 
1-11), the EP created for itself an informal de facto power of appointing 
individual Commissioners. 
In the follow up to the Maastricht treaty, the EP unilaterally intro-
duced a new internal rule of procedure prescribing that prior to EP 
voting for the investiture of the Commission as a collective body, it 
would organize confirmation hearings for individual nominees of 
Commissioners. The latter would be asked to appear before the respon-
sible committees of the EP where they would make a statement and 
answer questions. Based on these hearings, the committee would then 
report its conclusions to the President of the EP (Jacobs 1995,  p. 6). 
This provision was contested by the outgoing Commission (Interview 
1-4.2, Interview 2-4.2). Nonetheless, the EP made it explicit that it sim-
ply would not schedule a vote on the new Commission in its entirety 
until the Commission had complied with this requirement (Commission 
Service, internal note, 1994). The Santer Commission therefore agreed 
to go through the procedure, which in turn required a prior accord 
on the distribution of portfolios. MEPs strongly criticised the perfor-
mance of some candidates, but rather than rejecting the Commission as 
a whole, MEPs pressed for a reallocation of responsibilities. Following 
Jacques Sauter's resignation and prior to the vote on his successor, the 
EP obtained the concession from the Commission President that he 
would consider asking for the resignation of any Commissioner in whom 
the EP expressed a lack of confidence (Nugent 2001,  p. 86; Judge and 
Earnshaw 2002). Accordingly, in 2004, the EP started to conduct public 
hearings of Commissioner nominees and has done so ever since. 
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This rule of informal individual censorship was included in an inter-
institutional agreement in November 2010 (EP and EC, framework 
agreement, 2010). Therefore, the EP successfully created two new 
informal institutional rules to its advantage: the rules to hold individ-
ual hearings of Commissioners in order to judge their competencies, 
and to reserve the right to ask the Commission President to reshuffle 
or replace some members of his/her team. From the perspective of our 
general argument, this success is the result of a strategy of first mover 
(H2) and arena linking (HI): The EP created a new arena of hearings of 
individual Commissioner nominees (first mover strategy H2) and linked 
it to the arena of its competence of confirming the Commission in its 
entirety (HI). 
Case Three: The Transatlantic Trade 
andlnvestmentPartnership (111p)6 
The TTIP negotiations in an intergovernmental arena were launched 
in July 2013. After fifteen bargaining rounds between the 
 EU and US 
there was no concrete outcome. In spite of the current stalemate due 
to the US President Trump's intervention, the TTIP negotiations have 
fundamentally changed the EP's informal institutional involvement in 
the negotiation of international agreements that fall under the ordinary 
legislative procedure (Interview 11). The EP has never been included so 
extensively in negotiations and there has never been so much collabo-
ration between the Commission and the EP during the course of trade 
talks (Interview 11). What the EP aspired to obtain in this process 
included access to all negotiation documents and being involved in the 
negotiation mandate. Furthermore, the EP wanted negotiation docu-
ments to be made accessible to all MEPs, and not just those in relevant 
parliamentary committees. 
The EP was successful in reaching informal institutional change in its 
favour by applying two strategies, unilateral action (1-12) and mobilizing 
external actors with similar preferences over outcomes (1-13). 
In May 2013, the EP, moving fast, released a resolution before the 
Council had authorised the Commission's negotiation mandate. More 
specifically, the EP made its resolution public before the Council Working 
'This section is based on Hériter et al. (2018). 
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Group and discussed the negotiation directives (Interview 13). The res-
olution underlined the EP's request to have access to and a say in the 
negotiation mandate. The Commission acknowledged the EP's requests 
so that the parliamentary resolution served as a de facto negotiation 
mandate by the EP (Interview 13). When the Commission launched the 
TTIP negotiations, it tools into account the EP's position on the mandate 
(Interview 13). But also the Council preferred to coordinate with the 
EP when defining the negotiation directives in order to avoid an even- 
tual rejection of TTIP (Interview 14). This was a huge success for the 
EP and led to its informal institutional empowerment as its long-stand-
ing demands were met. Thus, in the case of TTIP, the EP informally co-
authorised the Commission's negotiation mandate. The EP would be on 
equal footing to the Council if this were formalised and, indeed, this is 
what some MEPs have recently requested (Interview 11, 12, 13). Hence 
by using this first-mover strategy across levels with respect to the mem-
ber states defining their negotiation mandate for the Commission, the 
EP was successful in increasing its informal institutional power. Rejecting 
this informal involvement of the EP in defining the negotiation man-
date would have jeopardized the negotiations with the counterpart. The 
necessities of transatlantic across arena decision-making exerted pres-
sure on the Commission and the Council to accept the EP's pressure to 
expand its informal institutional powers in the European arena. 
In another unilateral move, the EP took the unusual step of estab-
lishing, a direct link to the negotiating counterpart. It set up parlia-
mentary sessions and hearings with guests from the US delegation 
(Interview 12). Some MEPs also had direct meetings with American 
officials in Washington to discuss the TTIP negotiations (Interview 12). 
Although these meetings mainly revolved around gathering more infor-
mation on the negotiations (Interview 13), in fact, the EP unilaterally 
invented the rule of talking directly to the negotiating counterpart. Even 
though these direct meetings between the EP and the US do not have 
the status of fully-fledged negotiations, they represent a big step towards 
further empowering the EP as they provide it with the informal institu- 
tional power to talk directly with the negotiation partner. It would be 
difficult for the Commission to prevent the EP from unilaterally setting 
up meetings with the negotiation partner as this would incur very high 
costs in terms of time, staff and public credibility as well as possible ret-
ributions from parliamentarians; the EP's move to invite representatives 
from the US delegation can therefore be qualified as unilateral action. 
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Moreover, to obtain more institutional power with respect to access to 
negotiation documents, the EP used a mobilisation strategy of external 
actors with similar preferences over outcomes, in particular the European 
Ombudsman, as well international Civil Society Organisations. Hence 
it used a cross-arena and cross-level strategy to reinforce its attempts 
at informal institutional change. As claimed in H3: If there are pow-
erful and common-good oriented actors, who are generally in favour 
of empowering the EP, the latter may obtain an informal institutional 
change in its favour by mobilizing these actors. The underlying causal 
mechanism is that these actors successfully pressure the formal decision-
makers to empower the EP. 
The EP demanded access to all negotiation documents and that they 
are made available to all MEPs, and not just those in relevant parliamen-
tary committees and the 
 rapporteurs. 
 This request resonated with one of 
the most important concerns raised publicly regarding TTIP, i.e. a lack 
of transparency. Civil society organisations demanded public access to the 
EU's negotiation documents. Echoing public demands, the EP wanted 
the Commission to make documents co-authored by the US accessible, 
i.e. extending public access to documents to those of the negotiation 
partner (Interview 13). The EP literally stated in its resolution that the 
Commission should translate its "transparency efforts into meaningful 
practical results, inter alia by reaching agreements with the US side to 
improve transparency, including access to all negotiation documents for 
the Members of the European Parliament, including consolidated texts" 
(EP 201Sa, Art. ii). 
In order to pressure the Commission into the above measures, the EP 
mobilised third actors in favour of empowering the EP, more specifically, 
like-minded civil society organisations and the European Ombudsman 
(Crisp 2014). The European Ombudsman, in particular, had the nec-
essary organisational resources and legitimation to add weight to the 
EP's demand. The EP used the support of like-minded NGOs and of 
the European Ombudsman to back its position on TTIP's transparency 
over eleven months of informal negotiations with the Commission (EP 
2015b). 
First, the European Ombudsman launched a public consulta-
tion on TTIP's transparency to which it received 315 submissions 
(Ombudsman 2014). Based on this public consultation, the European 
Ombudsman then opened an own-initiative inquiry in 2014 addressing 
the Commission's efforts to make TTIP more accessible and transparent 
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(Ombudsman 2014). In addition to this own-initiative inquiry, civil 
society organisations and MEPs filed a complaint to the European 
Ombudsman regarding the secrecy of the Commission's negotiation 
documents (Crisp 2014). However, the European Ombudsman found 
no maladministration in this investigation because the Commission had 
already replied and improved measures based on the earlier own-initiative 
inquiry (Ombudsman 2015). Further to this, the EP joined in with cit-
izens' demands for more information on TTIP on the occasion of civil 
society organisations sending thousands of automated emails to the 
Commission to complain about the lack of transparency (Interview 11). 
The mobilisation strategy was a success. In December 2015, the EP 
issued a statement that all MEPs had access to all categories of confi-
dential documents relating to TTIP, including consolidated texts that 
reflect positions by the US (EP 2015b). "As a result of pressure from the 
European Parliament, the European public and the  EU Ombudsman, the 
European Commission introduced a "transparency initiative", during the 
1'1IP talks, which made an unprecedented number of documents avail-
able" (EP 2015b, italics as in original). The EP interpreted these new 
access rules as a precedent for the transparency of future international 
agreement negotiations (EP 2015b). The new rules resulted in the well- 
known `reading room', where all MEPs can consult classified documents 
(Interview 11). They also now have access to limited documents through 
a newly established database (Interview 13). Never before had the EP 
been so,, well informed and this was also achieved through the mobili-
sation of the public and European Ombudsman on the issue of trans-
parency. Thus, this provides confirmatory evidence of our mobilisation 
hypothesis H3. 
Overall, the EP's involvement in the TTIP negotiations was much 
greater than in earlier negotiations and it obtained significant informal 
institutional powers in the definition of the negotiation mandate and in 
having access to negotiating documents. 
CONCLUSION 
How can the theory of multilevel and  multi-arena governance be fruit-
fully linked to the theory of interstitial institutional change? The article 
develops a number of hypotheses linking the two approaches in order 
to show how the combination of the two can offer new perspective on 
how actors can take advantage of multilevel and  multi-arena governance 
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to expand their institutional power interstitially. Arthur Benz in his 
work (Benz 1989, 1992, 2009, 2016) very compellingly developed the 
dynamics of multilevel and multi-arena 
 governance and the opportuni-
ties and restrictions they constitute for bargaining processes. Linking his 
theoretical arguments to the bargaining dynamics of interstitial informal 
institutional change allows to gain additional insights on how actors can 
change the institutional status quo. These processes normally remain 
hidden if concentrating exclusively on the reforms of formal rules at one 
level. 
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